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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE CITY OF SALT LAKE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

JONATHAN LAMAR ARCHIBALD,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20001079-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Archibald's motion to
suppress based on the court's conclusion that Mr. Archibald was not seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when police officers questioned him?
Standard of Review: The factual findings underlying a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. Salt
Lake City v. Rav. 998 P.2d 274,276 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d
1225,1226-27 (Utah App. 1997). A trial court's determination of whether a
citizen-police encounter constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure is a legal
conclusion, based on a totality of facts, which is reviewed for correctness. Ray.
998P.2dat276.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, amendment IV.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Jonathan Lamar Archibald was charged with concealing his identity based on an incident
in June of 2000 wherein Mr. Archibald was alleged to have given an incorrect name and date of
birth to police officers.
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress and memorandum in support thereof, arguing
that the police officers unlawfully detained Mr. Archibald. (R. 16-25.) The City failed to file a
response prior to the suppression hearing. At the hearing, defense counsel and the City
Prosecutor stipulated to the facts as set forth m defense counsel's memorandum and proffered
additional stipulated facts. (R. 82-83.) After hearing argument from counsel, the court took the
matter under advisement. (R. 94.)
The court denied Mr. Archibald's motion, concluding that Mr. Archibald was not
unlawfully detained when officers questioned him regarding his identity and date of birth. (R. 15;
76.) Mr. Archibald then entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion. (R. 76-79.) Mr. Archibald timely appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 27,2000, an Information wasfiledin the Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, in and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah, charging Jonathan Lamar Archibald with
one count of concealing identification, a class C misdemeanor, pursuant to Salt Lake City Code §
11.04.100 (1996). (R. 1.) Mr. Archibald pled not guilty and counsel was appointed.
On September 10, defense counsel filed the motion to suppress and memorandum in
2

support thereof. (R. 16-25.) A motion hearing was set for October 16, 2000. The City failed to
file a response to defense counsel's motion and memorandum.
At the suppression hearing on October, 16,2000, counsel stipulated to the facts as set
forth in Mr. Archibald's memorandum, and additional facts proffered by the prosecution. (R. 8283.) On Monday, June 26,2000, at 10:47 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer Brent Hillam
"responded to suspicious circumstances at 176 W 600 S #201 (Motel 6) at 2247 hours." (R. 16.)
The impetus for the officer's visit was that "[a]n anonymous comp. stated that there were
possible criminal activities inside the given room." (R. 16.) A supplemental police report
indicates that the "Anon comp reporting drugs and solicitation in rm 201 unkn number of susps
#1 Asian female nfd." (R. 16.)
Upon arriving at the motel, the officers1 knocked on the front door of motel room #201,
the only entrance into and exitfromthe motel room. (R. 17; 89.) Although no one responded to
the officers' knocks, the officers observed a face looking through the curtained window of the
motel room. (R. 17.) Upon seeing the officers, the occupant quickly removed his face from the
window and declined to respond to the officers' knocks. (R. 17.)
Upon seeing that the motel room was occupied, the officers continued to knock on the
door of motel room #201. (R. 82-83.) In fact, the officers knocked for an additional 45 seconds
upon seeing that the room was occupied. (R. 82-83.) Finally, the occupant relented and opened
the door. The officers asked the occupant for his name, date of birth and age. (R. 17.) When the
occupant provided an age which did not correlate with his date of birth, the officers arrested him
1

At some point prior to knocking on Mr. Archibald's motel room door, Officer Hillam
was joined by a second officer.
3

for giving false information to a police officer. (R. 17.) This occupant was later identified as
Jonathan Archibald. (R. 23.) No evidence of drugs or solicitation was found in Mr. Archibald's
room. (R. 23.)
After reviewing these facts and hearing argument from both counsel, the district court
took the matter under advisement and asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel to submit
any additional case law to the court by the following day (October 17). (R. 94.) The court then
informed counsel he would arrange a phone conference to render his decision (R. 94.) Rather
than submit case law to the court, which defense counsel did, the prosecutor opted to finally
respond to defense counsel's motion to suppress and memorandum in support thereof by filing a
memorandum in opposition to the defense's motion to suppress on the 17th of October. (R. 2638.) Defense counsel filed a reply memorandum on the 19th of October, responding to the issues
raised in the City's memorandum and asking the court to disregard the City's memorandum due
to the untimeliness of the filing.2 (R. 40-46.)
On October 30,2000, the court denied Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress. (R. 76.) As
a result, Mr. Archibald entered a Serv3 or conditional plea of guilty to concealing identification.
(R. 76-78.) The court sentenced Mr. Archibald to credit for time served and closed the case. (R.
79.)

2

At the motion hearing, the prosecutor stated that she had "chose[n] not tofilea motion
in response." (R. 84.) Despite this representation, the prosecutorfileda written response.
Defense counsel still objects to consideration of this motion due to its untimeliness and the fact
that the City waived its right to file a responsive motion.
3

State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Police officers violated Mr. Archibald's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures by knocking on his residence door at an unreasonable hour and refusing to leave,
thereby seizing Mr. Archibald. The district court erred in concluding that such circumstances did
not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR.
ARCHIBALD WAS NOT SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the encounter between police officers and Mr.

Archibald was consensual and therefore not in violation of Mr. Archibald's Fourth Amendment
Rights. The trial court concluded that even though the officers knocked on Mr. Archibald's
motel room door for a period of time,
there is no evidence that Mr. Archibald had been seized or detained under the
meaning, the legal meaning of that word. That as Ms. Ward had pointed out in
her memorandum, all that the officers may have intended to do was ask Mr.
Archibald questions. It may very well have been that if he had said I don't want
to answer, they would have left him alone. We don't know that. But, in any
event, that may have been their intention when they were knocking at the door.
Other than to get him to come to the door, there is no evidence that they had
actually detained him. Based on that evidence, that conclusion, I would conclude
that there was no seizure and deny the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.4
(R. 76.)
4

Defense counsel also argued that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to
detain or seize Mr. Archibald. (R. 16-21; 43-46.) Because the district court concluded that Mr.
Archibald was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the court did not address the issue of
whether the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Mr. Archibald.
5

A.

Mr. Archibald Was Seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the public

which are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d
223, 230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)).
The hallmark of a level I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen to
decline answering an officer's inquiries simply by walking away. Salt Lake City v. Rav. 998
P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). Most level I encounters occur when a citizen in a
public place is approached by police officers. See, e.g.. Rav. 998 P.2d at 274 (in front of a
convenience store); Deitman. 739 P.2d at 616 (on public sidewalk/street); State v. Davis. 821
P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) (on side of public road). A level I encounter may escalate into a level II
encounter when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe
that he or she is not free to leave. State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 ,1227-28 (Utah App. 1997);
Jackson. 805 P.2d at 767. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer, by
show of physical force or authority, restrains that person's liberty. Ray. 998 P.2d at 277; Bean.
869 P.2d at 986. The subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant to the determination of whether
a Fourth Amendment seizure and/or violation has occurred. See Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S.
6

463,470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778,2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) ("Whether a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' and not on the officer's actual state of mind
at the time the challenged action was taken." (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128,136, 98 S.Ct. 1717,1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). The encounter between Mr.
Archibald and the police officers qualifies as a level II encounter due to the time the encounter
occurred, the location of the encounter and the length of time the officers knocked on the door.
i.

Time of the Encounter

It was nearly 11:00 p.m. when police officers began knocking on the door to Mr.
Archibald's motel room. Absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr.
Archibald had engaged or was about to engage in criminal conduct, it was unreasonable for the
police officers to knock on Mr. Archibald's motel room door given the time of night. Certainly
no reasonable person would expect a visitfroma friend or family member at such a late hour
absent an emergency, let alone a police officer.
What is objectively reasonable or unreasonable with regard to the time of day or night
that an individual knocks on one's front door may be extrapolated from other related statutes and
cases that define daytime and nighttime.
Section 77-7-5 of Utah Code defines daytime and nighttime in the context of executing
misdemeanor and felony arrest warrants. According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (2) (1999),
misdemeanor arrest warrants may only be executed during daytime hours, which the statute
defines as anytime between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., while felony arrest warrants may be
executed anytime, day or night. Nighttime is defined as anytime after 10:00 p.m. but before 6:00
7

a.m.
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205 (1) (1999) requires all search warrants to be
served and executed during the daytime "unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason." Interpreting this statute, the
Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the term nighttime "means that period of time from one
half hour after sunset to one half hour before sunrise." State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614,617
(Utah App. 1993).
These statutes are particularly instructive because they deal with situations where police
officers have probable cause to either arrest an individual or search the premises belonging to
that individual. That is, these definitions address situations where police officers are acting
lawfully, with the requisite probable cause. However, even in these situations, there are limits to
when it is permissible for officers to exercise their lawful authority. Where officers are acting
without the benefit of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, certainly they should be
required to meet a higher standard of courtesy and respect. Regardless of which definition of
nighttime is applied to this case, the officers knocking on Mr. Archibald's door at almost 11:00
at night certainly would be considered unreasonable under either definition.
ii

Location of the Encounter

Mr. Archibald was staying overnight in a motel room when officers knocked on his door
at almost 11:00 p.m. There is no question that this motel room was Mr. Archibald's dwelling
place the evening the officers knocked on his motel room door. When a citizen is inside his or
her dwelling place, be it a home, motel or apartment, that citizen and his or her dwelling place
8

enjoy special protection under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,16 (Utah
App. 1993).
Mr. Archibald's motel room had only one entrance and exit: the front door. (R. 89.)
When two armed, uniformed police officers knocked on the door to his motel room at nearly
11:00 p.m., Mr. Archibald looked out the window. (R. 17; 23.) Upon seeing the officers, Mr.
Archibald moved away from the window with no intent of answering the door. (R. 17; 23.)
Upon seeing Mr. Archibald and observing his apparent unwillingness to open the door, the
officers did not leave the outer vestibule of his room. Instead, the officers knocked on the door
to Mr. Archibald's room for an additional 45 seconds straight. (R. 17; 23.) With no way to leave
the motel room to avoid the officers' disruption of the quiet enjoyment of his motel room, Mr.
Archibald relented and answered the door. (R. 17.) The officers immediately questioned Mr.
Archibald regarding his name, age and date of birth. (R. 17.)
Based on these facts, the district court concluded "all that the officers may have intended
to do was ask Mr. Archibald questions. It may very well have been that if he had said I don't
want to answer, they would have left him alone. We don't know that. But, in any event, that
may have been their intention when they were knocking at the door. Other than to get him to
come to the door, there is no evidence that they had actually detained him." (R. 76.)
The district court's analysis places heavy emphasis on the subjective intent of the police
officers who went to Mr. Archibald motel room and persistently knocked on the only door
leading into and out of the room. The subjective intentions of the police officers, lawful or
unlawful, are irrelevant to the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
See Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71,105 S.Ct. at 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d at 370. The determination of
9

whether Mr. Archibald was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is based on an objective
view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter between Mr. Archibald and
the officers. Accordingly, the subjective intentions of the officers who persistently knocked on
Mr. Archibald's motel room door are irrelevant.
At the suppression hearing, the City argued that because Mr. Archibald was free to
disregard the officers' knocking at his motel room door, he was not detained or seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The City asserted that because the police were in a public
place, knocking on Mr. Archibald's door, and Mr. Archibald chose to answer the door, his action
was voluntary and the encounter was consensual. (R. 87.) In support of its position, the City
relied on California v. Hodari P., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547,113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) and
United States v. $32,400.00. 82 F.3d 135 (7th Cir. 1996).
In Hodari P.. police officers on routine patrol in a high-crime area in Oakland, California,
observed five young men huddled around a red car. When the youth saw the police car
approaching, they fled on foot and the officers gave chase. The defendant, one of the youth, fled
down an alley but was soon located by one of the officers. As the officer began to close in on the
defendant, he threw something. The officer tackled the defendant, handcuffed him and radioed
for backup. It was later discovered that the item thrown by the defendant was crack cocaine.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not seized at the time he threw the cocaine but
was seized at the time the officer tackled him. The Court concluded that a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment only occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." 499 U.S. at 625 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,19, n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868,1879, n. 16,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Because the
10

defendant had not submitted to the officer's show of authority, the defendant was not seized. It
was only when the defendant submitted to the officer's show of authority (i.e., when he was
tackled) that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment had occurred.
Conversely, Mr. Archibald did submit to the officers' show of authority because he had
no other option. This was not a street encounter where Mr. Archibald could simply turn and
walk away; this was an encounter at Mr. Archibald's residence, with the officers blocking Mr.
Archibald's only means of entry into and exit from the residence. Mr. Archibald looked out
through the curtains of his motel room window, observed the officers and retreated into his room.
The officers saw Mr. Archibald peek his head out from behind the curtains and at that point,
knocked on his door for 45 seconds before Mr. Archibald submitted to their show of authority
and finally opened the door. Thus, the instant matter occurred in a confined area, not on a public
street, and unlike the defendant in Hodari P.. Mr. Archibald did submit to the officers' authority.
The other case relied upon by the City below, United States v. $32,400.00, 82 F.3d 135
(7th Cir. 1996), is similarly inapposite. In $32,4000.00, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a seizure did not occur when the defendant's vehicle was "boxed in" by two
police cars because the defendant "did not in any way submit to any asserted show of authority."
82 F.3d at 139. The defendant in $32,400.00 was inside her vehicle when it was boxed in by
two police cars. Rather than exiting her vehicle and submitting to the officers' authority, the
defendant attempted to flee the scene in her vehicle by ramming the police vehicles. Moreover,
the police officers in $32,400.00 possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant

11

had engaged or was engaged in drug trafficking. Id at 140.5 Again, Mr. Archibald did submit to
the officers' show of authority, unlike the defendant in $32,400.00. and Mr. Archibald had no
reasonable means to disregard the show of authority, such as driving away in his vehicle like the
defendant in $32.400.00 did. Thus, $32.400.00 bolsters Mr. Archibald's assertion that he was
seized because he did submit to the officers' authority. Moreover, $32.400.00 is a Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals decision which is not controlling authority.
In addressing an issue similar to that addressed by the Seventh Circuit, the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989), reached a different conclusion. In
Smith, the defendant's vehicle was observed by a police officer pulled over to the right hand side
of the road in an area with a high incidence of prostitution. Id at 880. The officer noticed an
individual leaning into the defendant's vehicle through an unrolled passenger window. Id.
When the individual saw the officer in a marked car, the individual walked toward a motel
immediately adjacent to the defendant's vehicle. Id After the individual walked away, the
defendant's vehicle made a right-hand turn into the driveway leading to the motel without
signaling. Id The officer pulled his vehicle in behind the defendant's car, blocking the
defendant's egress. Id Thereafter, the defendant exited his vehicle and the officer exited his
vehicle; the defendant and officer met between the parked cars. Id The officer asked the

5

It must be noted that the 7th Circuit misstates the law in its restatement of the Hodari D.
decision. The 7th Circuit erroneously states that Hodari D stands for the proposition that "[i]f no
physical force accompanied the show of authority and a person chose to ignore or reject that
show of authority, the defendant is not seized until the officer applied physical force and the
person submitted to the officer's show of authority." $32.400.00. 82 F.3d at 138 (emphasis
added), citing Hodari P.. 499 U.S. at 624-27. Hodari D. states no requirement that a person be
subjected to physical force in order to be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.
12

defendant for his car registration and identification. Id, The stop led to the defendant's arrest
and an inventory search of his vehicle, which revealed small baggies of heroin and cocaine. Id.
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the stop, which the district court
deemed a voluntary encounter. Id. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeal concluded that when
the officer pulled his vehicle in behind the defendant's car, blocking the defendant's egress, the
officer had seized the defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id at 881-82. In reaching its
conclusion the appellate court noted that "[o]ther jurisdictions have held that when an officer
blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred
even though the original stop was not initiated by the officer." Id at 882 n.3. Applying the
Smith analysis, Mr. Archibald was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. Archibald was confronted by two uniformed police officers at his dwelling place at
almost 11:00 p.m., which, as previously noted, is an unreasonable time. Because the officers
were obstructing the only entrance into and exit from Mr. Archibald's room, he had no place to
go if he wished to avoid the officers and clearly the officers were not content with Mr.
Archibald's apparent unwillingness to speak with them. When the officers first knocked on the
door, Mr. Archibald looked outside, saw the officers and declined to answer. The officers kept
knocking, however, clearly conveying a message to Mr. Archibald that they were not going to
leave until he answered the door. See Beavers. 859 P.2d at 17 (n[T]he only risk that exists if an
investigatory stop is not effected is the risk that investigation of potential criminal activity might
be delayed or, at worst, thwarted altogether. That risk is diminished in the residential setting
because the person police wish to question is located in a dwelling that can generally be staked
out until the person emerges, if a polite knock at the door fails to produce a suspect willing to
13

voluntarily answer police inquiries.11 (Emphasis added.)). Accordingly, the fact that Mr.
Archibald was approached at his place of residence supports the conclusion that Mr. Archibald
was detained or seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
iii. Length of Knocking
The police officers went to Mr. Archibald's motel room after receiving an anonymous tip
of possible criminal activities in the motel room, including "drugs and solicitation." (R. 16.)
After the officers knocked on the door to Mr. Archibald's room, he looked out the window and
seeing two uniformed, armed police officers, retreated back into his room and declined to answer
the door. (R. 17.) Upon seeing Mr. Archibald through the window, the officers knocked again
and did not stop knocking for 45 seconds. (R. 17; 82-83.) While 45 seconds may not seem like a
significant period of time on paper, it is an unbearably long period of time when actually
demonstrated. Defense counsel attempted to demonstrate how long 45 seconds really is by
knocking for 45 seconds straight on the wooden podium in the courtroom, much in the same way
a person would knock on a door. (R. 89.) The court stopped defense counsel after 15-20 seconds
of knocking. (R. 89.)
It is particularly revealing that once the police officers observed Mr. Archibald look out
at them from his motel room window, they began knocking for 45 seconds. (R. 82-83.) Mr.
Archibald's refusal to answer when the officersfirstknocked on the door to his motel room was
a tacit declination of the officers' invitation to voluntarily come to the door. Given that Mr.
Archibald first declined to answer the initial knocks at his door by the two officers and that the
intensive, 45 second knocking began only after Mr. Archibald's refusal to answer the officers'
first invitation to come to the door, a reasonable person in Mr. Archibald's position would
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believe that the officers had no intention of leaving the motel room unless and until the occupant
answered the officers' knocking. Thus, the length of the officers' knocking on Mr. Archibald's
door supports the conclusion that Mr. Archibald was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

THE OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO
SEIZE MR. ARCHIBALD
In light of its conclusion that the officers' encounter with Mr. Archibald was voluntary,

the district court did not reach the issue of whether the officers possessed reasonable, articulable
suspicion to seize and detain Mr. Archibald. This issue was argued to the district court below by
both defense counsel and the prosecutor.
Assuming that Mr. Archibald was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, to justify the
seizure the officers must have possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Archibald had
committed, was about to commit or was in the act of committing a crime. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999) (MA peace
officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."). Generally, reasonable suspicion
stems from an officer's first-hand observations, perceptions and inferences. Kavsville v.
Mulcahy. 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App. 1997). However, in some cases, an officer may rely
upon second-hand information, including an informant's tip. Id. An officer's reliance upon an
informant's tip for reasonable suspicion is permissible only if the tip is sufficiently reliable. Id.;
State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah App. 1991). Reliability must extend beyond
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information readily observable to the general public. Florida v. J.L.. 2000 WL 309131, * 4 (U.S.
S. Ct. 2000). "The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Id Utah appellate courts
have identified three factors which must be evaluated in order to determine whether a tip is
sufficiently reliable to qualify as reasonable suspicion: (1) the type of tip or informant involved;
(2) whether the information about criminal activity is sufficiently detailed to support a stop; and
(3) whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the information provided by the
tip. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 235-36.
Here, the police responded to Mr. Archibald's motel room based on anonymous tip
reporting "drugs and solicitation." An anonymous complainant is on the low-end of the
reliability scale because the complainant's basis of knowledge and veracity are unknown. IcL at
235. Moreover, an unidentified complainant is not exposed to possible criminal or civil
prosecution if the report is false. Id The anonymous tip here is quite unreliable under the first
factor because the tipster is unidentified, and therefore not subject to criminal or civil prosecution
for making a false report. It should be noted that Mr. Archibald was arrested for providing false
information, not for solicitation or drug possession/trafficking. It may be assumed that the
tipster's complaint was a false report.
The information given to police by the anonymous tipster was that there were "drugs" in
room 201 of the Motel 6 and that there was "solicitation" going on in the same room. This
information is hardly sufficient to support a seizure of Mr. Archibald. The only information
conveyed by this anonymous tip is that room 201 of the Motel 6 was occupied, a fact easily
observable and not indicative of the detail necessary to show reliability.
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Finally, the officers were unable to confirm any of the purported criminal activities in
room 201 upon their arrival at the Motel 6. The officers observed nothing to confirm the
anonymous tip of "drugs and solicitation" in room 201. Moreover, the officers did not even
make an attempt to conduct surveillance on room 201.
Additionally, the tip arrived through a police dispatch which merely identified alleged
criminal activity and a motel room associated with that alleged activity. That anonymous tip
seems to identify an "Asian female" as one of the purported suspects. Certainly Mr. Archibald is
not an Asian female. "Merely providing descriptive information to an officer about whom to
stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which
establish why a stop was to be made." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274,1278 (Utah App. 1994).
Here, the officers possessed descriptive information that they were looking for, at least, an Asian
female. That was all. "[I]f an investigating officer relies solely on transmitted information from
other sources, no legally sufficient reasonable suspicion exists in the absence of a demonstrated
factual basis for the issuing department's information." Id at 1279-80, citing United States v.
Ornelas-Ledesma. 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir.1994) (uncorroborated tip by itself does not justify
stop, even if tip comes from law enforcement sources); United States v. Cutchin. 956 F.2d 1216,
1218 (D.C.Cir.1992) (evidence contained on 911 tapes goes directly to issue of whether dispatch
had requisite reasonable suspicion); Ex parte State. 494 So.2d 719, 721 (Ala. 1986) (radio
dispatch describing vehicle involved in drug sale not sufficient to justify stop absent evidence of
circumstances giving rise to dispatch): Kaiser v. State. 296 Ark. 125,752 S.W.2d 271,272-73
(1988) (no evidence in record to support reasonable suspicion for directive, broadcast by
Missouri police to Arkansas police, to stop vehicle carrying drugs); In re Eskiel S.« 15 Cal.App.
17

4th 1638, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 455,458 (1993) (record devoid of evidence showing officer who
originated report had reasonable suspicion); Village of Gurnee v. Gross. 174 Ill.App.3d 66, 123
Ill.Dec. 866, 528 N.E.2d 411,412 (1988) (no evidence presented that related to source or factual
basis of reckless driving complaint broadcast to investigating officer); Commonwealth v. Fraser.
410 Mass. 541, 573 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1991) (no evidence indicating reasonable suspicion for
officer making radio call describing armed person in vehicle); State v. Franklin. 841 S.W.2d 639,
644 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (no evidence in record establishing basis of dispatch concerning armed
individual in certain vehicle); State v. Thompson. 231 Neb. 771,438 N.W.2d 131,136-37 (1989)
(no evidence in dispatch tape that proved factual foundation for a broadcast concerning a
"suspicious" vehicle in a certain area); Garza v. State. 771 S.W.2d 549, 558-59
(Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc) (officer who passed information that defendant was "good for"
burglaries in investigating officer's area had no articulable facts to support statement).
Considering these factors, the anonymous tip was wholly unreliable and uncorroborated.
Accordingly, the tip provided no reasonable suspicion that would justify the officers' seizure of
Mr. Archibald.
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CONCLUSION
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Archibald was seized without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accordingly, we respectfully request that this Court
reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Archibald's motion to suppress and remand for
further proceedings, if any.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /S^ day of March, 2001.

S^NNONROMERO
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum B

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
1999

77-7-3. By private persons.
A private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and he
has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed it.
i960
77-7-4. M a g i s t r a t e m a y orally order arrest.
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to
arrest anyone committing or attempting to commit a
public offense in the presence of the magistrate, and,
in the case of an emergency, when probable cause
exists, a magistrate may orally authorize a peace
officer to arrest a person for a public offense, and
thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall
be filed against the person arrested.
1980
77-7-5.

I s s u a n c e o f warrant — Time a n d place
a r r e s t s m a y b e made — Contents of
w a r r a n t — Responsibility for transp o r t i n g p r i s o n e r s — Court clerk t o
d i s p e n s e restitution for transportation.
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest
upon finding probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the
offense charged is:
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be
made at any time of the day or night; or
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant
can be made at night only if:
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the warrant;
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a
public highway, in a public place, or in a place
open to or accessible to the public; or
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the regular course
of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated to the misdemeanor
warrant for arrest.
For the purpose of Subsection (1):
(a) daytime hours are the hours of 6:00 a.m. to^
10:00 p.m.; and
(b) nighttime hours are the hours after 10:00
p.m. and before 6:00 a.m.
(3) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must appear in court, the magistrate shall
include in the arrest warrant the name of the law
enforcement agency in the county or municipality
with jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified
by the magistrate under Subsection (3Xa) is
responsible for providing inter-county transportation of the defendant, if necessary, from
the arresting law enforcement agency to the
court site.
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on
the warrant may contract with another law
enforcement agency to have a defendant,
transported.
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified
by the magistrate under Subsection (a) as
responsible for transporting the defendant
shall provide to the court clerk of the court in
which the defendant is tried, an affidavit
stating that the defendant was transported.

77-7-9

indicating the law enforcement agency responsible for the transportation, and stating
the number of miles the defendant was transported.
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental transportation expenses and dispense restitution monies collected by t h e
court to the law enforcement agency responsible for the transportation of a convicted
defendant.
1999
77-7-5.5.

Repealed.

1991

77-7-6. Manner of making arrest.
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the
person being arrested of his intention, cause, and
authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be
required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will
endanger the life or safety of the officer or another
person or will likely enable the party being arrested to escape;
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, an offense; or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or an
escape.
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in
Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged
violation of a criminal law, including a local
ordinance, the arresting officer shall assess the
communicative abilities of the hearing-impaired
person and conduct this notification, and any
further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of statements, in a manner that
accurately and effectively communicates with the
hearing-impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for the deaf.
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor
to be considered by any court when evaluating
whether statements of a hearing-impaired person
were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
1995
77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly
resists after being informed of the intention to make
the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used
only as provided in Section 76-2-404.
i960
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken,
when.
Tb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is
a felony, and in all cases, a peace officer, may break the
door or window of the building in which the person to
be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable
grounds for believing him to be. Before making the
break, the person shall demand admission and explain the purpose for which admission is desired.
Demand and explanation need not be given before
breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or
where there is reason to believe evidence will be
secreted or destroyed.
i960
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner.
Any person making an arrest may seize from the
person arrested all weapons which he may have on or
about his person.
i960
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ing t h e warrant to sign the magistrate's name on
the warrant. This warrant shall be called a duplicate original warrant and shall be deemed a
w a r r a n t for purposes of this chapter. In these
cases t h e magistrate shall cause to be made an
original warrant. The magistrate shall enter the
exact time of issuance of the duplicate original
w a r r a n t on the face of the original warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and
the original warrant shall be in conformity with
this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate shall
require the person who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds for issuance of
the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript.
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall
issue a search warrant.
1998
77-23-205. T i m e for s e r v i c e — Officer m a y r e quest assistance.
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the
affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the
property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case
he may insert a direction that it be served any time of
the day or night. An officer may request other persons
to assist him in conducting the search.
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten
days from the date of issuance. Any search warrant
not executed within this time shall be void and shall
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed.
1994

77-23-206. Receipt for property taken.
When t h e officer seizes property pursuant to a
search warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person
from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave
t h e receipt in the place where h e found the property.
Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render t h e
evidence seized inadmissible a t trial.
1994
77-23-207. Return — Inventory of property
taken.
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to the
magistrate and deliver a written inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held.

(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose,
there is no response or he is not admitted with
reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority a n d purpose,
if the magistrate issuing the w a r r a n t directs in
t h e w a r r a n t t h a t the officer need not give notice.
The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, t h a t the object of t h e search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or t h a t
physical h a r m may result to any person if notice
were given.
1994
77-23-211.

Violation of h e a l t h , safety, b u i l d i n g ,
o r animal c r u e l t y l a w s or o r d i n a n c e s
— Warrants t o o b t a i n e v i d e n c e .
In addition to other w a r r a n t s provided by this
chapter, magistrates, upon a showing of probable
cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, h a s been violated in relation to health, safety,
building, or animal cruelty, may issue a w a r r a n t for
the purpose of obtaining evidence of a violation. Warrants may be obtained from a magistrate upon request of peace officers and state, county, a n d municipal health, fire, building, and animal control
personnel only after approval by a prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall
be directed to any peace officer within t h e county
where the w a r r a n t is to be executed, who shall serve
the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany
the officer.
1994
77-23-212.

E v i d e n c e s e i z e d p u r s u a n t t o warrant not excluded unless unlawful
s e a r c h or s e i z u r e s u b s t a n t i a l — "Substantial" defined.

(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant may not be suppressed at a motion,
trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct
of the peace officer is shown to be substantial.
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered substantial and in bad faith if the w a r r a n t w a s
obtained with malicious purpose a n d without probable cause or was executed maliciously a n d willfully
beyond t h e authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity.
1997
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1994

77-23-208. Safekeeping of property.
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible
for its safekeeping and maintenance until t h e court
otherwise orders.
1994
77-23-209. Return of papers t o district court.
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions and
affidavits upon which the search warrant is based, the
search warrant, the return, and the inventory. If he is
without authority to proceed further with respect to
t h e offense under which t h e warrant was issued, h e
shall r e t u r n them to the appropriate court of the
county having jurisdiction within 15 days after the
return.
1994
77-23-210. Force used i n executing warrant —
When notice of authority i s required
a s a prerequisite.
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing
1 entry into any building, room, conveyance, compart| ment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:

77-27-21.5

Section
77-27-21.5.
x

Sex offender registration — Information system — Law enforcement and
courts to report — Registration —
Penalty — Effect of expungement.

77-27-21.5. Sex offender registration — Information system — Law enforcement
and courts to report — Registration —
Penalty — Effect of expungement.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Department" means the Department of
Corrections.
(b) "Notification" means a person's acquisition
of information from the department about a sex
offender, including his place of habitation, physical description, and methodology of the offense,
and other information as provided in Subsections
(10) and (11).
(c) "Register" means to comply with the rules
of the department made under this section.

77-7-10

CRIMINAL AND TRAFFIC CODE

77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authorization
of execution of arrest warrant.
Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a warrant of arrest, authonze by telegraph, telephone or
other reasonable means, its execution A copy of the
warrant or notice of its issuance and t e r m s may be
sent to one or more peace officers The copy or notice
communicated authorizes the officer to proceed in the
same manner under it as if he h a d a n original warrant
1980

77-7-11. Possession of warrant by arresting officer not required.
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest may arrest a person he
reasonably believes to be the person described in the
warrant, without the peace officer having physical
possession of the warrant
i960
77-7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting or library theft — Persons authorized.
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who has reasonable grounds
to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the
merchant have been taken by a person with intent to
steal may, for the purpose of investigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the goods,
detain the person in a reasonable manner for a
reasonable length of time
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committed or is m the act of committmg or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
1980

77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for dangerous weapon —
Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any
other person is m danger
1980
77-7-17.

A u t h o r i t y of peace officer to take pos-

session of weapons.
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a frisk may take and keep it until the
completion of the questioning, at which time he shall
either return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person
1980
77-7-18.

Citation o n misdemeanor or infraction

charge.

(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may
detain a person for the purposes and u n d e r t h e limits
of Subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to
believe the person violated Title 76, C h a p t e r 6, P a r t 8,
Library Theft
1987

A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into
custody, any public official of any county or municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, a portof-entry agent as defined in Section 72-1-102, and a
volunteer authorized to issue a citation under Section
41-6-19 5 m a y issue and deliver a citation requiring
any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the
court of the magistrate before whom the person
should be taken pursuant to law if the person had
been arrested
1998

77-7-13.

77-7-19.

Arrest w i t h o u t w a r r a n t b y p e a c e offic e r — R e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s , w h a t cons t i t u t e s — E x e m p t i o n f r o m c i v i l or
c r i m i n a l liability.

(1) A peace officer may arrest, without warrant,
any person the officer has reasonable ground to beheve has committed a theft under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part 8, Library Theft, or of goods held or displayed for
sale
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under
Part 8, Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or
by a merchant, merchant's employee, servant, or
agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and
the peace officer is relieved from any civil or criminal
liability

1998

77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of
person suspected of shoplifting or library theft — Civil and criminal immunity.
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who causes the detention of
a person as provided m Section 77-7-12, or who causes
the arrest of a person for theft of goods held or
displayed for sale, is not criminally or civilly liable
where he has reasonable and probable cause to believe the person detained or arrested committed a
theft of goods held or displayed for sale
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who
causes a detention or arrest of a person u n d e r Title 76,
Chapter 6, P a r t 8, Library Theft, is not criminally or
civilly liable where he has reasonable a n d probable
cause to believe t h a t the person committed a theft of
library materials
1987
77-7-15.

A u t h o r i t y of p e a c e officer t o s t o p a n d
question suspect — Grounds.

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has

A p p e a r a n c e required by citation — Arr e s t for failure to appear — Transfer of
c a s e s — Motor vehicle violations —
D i s p o s i t i o n of fines and costs.

(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall
appear before the magistrate designated m the citation on or before the tune and date specified in the
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adopted by
the Judicial Council or Subsection 77-7-21(1) permits
forfeiture of bail for the offense charged
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following
its issuance
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to
comply with Section 77-7-21 on or before the tune and
date and at the court specified is subject to arrest The
* magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a
citation or information issued for violations of Title 41
shall state that the person receiving the citation or
information shall appear before the magistrate who
has jurisdiction over the offense charged
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of
either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney,
based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or the disqualification of the judge, transfer cases to a justice
court with territorial jurisdiction or the district court
within the county
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel
serving the courts shall ensure that all citations
for violation of Title 41 are filed in a court with
jurisdiction and venue and shall refuse to receive
citations that should be filed in another court
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures imposed
or collected for violations of Title 41, which are
filed contrary to this section shall be paid to the
entitled municipality or county by the state,
county, or municipal treasurer who has received

